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Brexit’s	epicentre:	London’s	financial	services	sector
and	its	place	in	the	UK	economy
Developments	in	London’s	financial	district	help	us	understand	the	precise	form	that	Brexit	will	take,
argues	Sarah	Hall.	She	explains	why	London	is	distinct	to	the	rest	of	the	UK	and	writes	that,	as
companies	threaten	to	move	to	other	European	cities	in	anticipation	of	a	‘no	deal’,	the	government’s
decision	making	is	still	not	reflecting	the	City’s	strategic	importance.
London,	and	its	financial	services	sector	in	particular,	provides	vital	insights	into	understanding
England’s	Brexit	vote	in	June	2016.	Economically,	politically,	culturally	and	socially,	the	capital’s	8.7	million	residents
are	increasingly	characterised	by	their	distinctiveness	as	compared	to	those	living	elsewhere	in	the	UK	–	a	trend	that
has	intensified	following	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-8.	For	example,	figures	from	the	Office	for	National	Statistics
show	that	even	after	accounting	for	higher	housing	costs,	gross	disposable	household	income	was	highest	in	London
in	2015	at	£25,293	compared	with	£16,197	in	the	North	East	of	England	and	£15,913	in	Northern	Ireland.
For	the	full	data	see	here.
Meanwhile,	the	Centre	for	Cities	revealed	the	extent	to	which	the	UK	relies	on	tax	receipts	from	the	capital	arguing
that	London	generates	45%	of	the	taxes	generated	in	urban	areas	in	2014/15	equivalent	to	almost	as	much	tax	as
the	next	37	cities	combined.
The	distinctiveness	of	London	in	relation	to	the	rest	of	the	UK	was	also	clearly	demonstrated	in	the	Brexit	vote.
London	was	one	of	a	handful	of	predominately	University	cities	to	vote	remain	in	the	referendum	in	June	2016.	This
reflects	the	comparatively	high	levels	of	migration	coupled	with	relatively	strong	economic	growth	enjoyed	by
Londoners.	However,	in	contrast,	the	success	of	London	relative	to	the	rest	of	the	UK	was	also	important	in	driving
the	ultimately	successful	Leave	vote.	For	authors	such	as	Danny	Dorling,	this	vote	was	driven	by	growing	inequality
following	a	prolonged	period	of	austerity	politics	that	have	resulted	in	worsening	health	outcomes	and	declining	living
standards	for	many	British	citizens	who	wanted	someone	or	something	to	blame.
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In	the	two	years	since	the	vote,	London’s	distinctiveness	has	become	increasingly	significant	in	relation	to	the	future
development	of	the	UK’s	economy	after	Brexit.	This	stems	from	the	fact	that	the	economy	relies	on	the	service	sector
which	makes	up	79.6%	of	the	UK’s	GDP	and	is	driven	by	financial	services	in	London’s	international	financial	district.
Indeed,	financial	and	related	professional	services	–	such	as	legal	services	and	the	insurance	sector	–	which	are
overwhelmingly	concentrated	in	London	make	up	a	significant	part	of	this,	accounting	for	6.5%	of	UK	economic
output	in	2017.	However,	the	impacts	of	Brexit	on	the	strategically	important	financial	services	sector	are	best
characterised	by	profound	uncertainty	with	potentially	significant	implications	for	the	future	trajectory	of	the	UK
economy.
There	are	two	main	causes	of	this	uncertainty.	Firstly,	despite	the	rapidly	approaching	negotiation	deadline,	the
precise	nature	of	Brexit	remains	unknown.	What	is	clear	is	that	the	financial	services	sector	at	the	heart	of	London’s
economy	will	not	be	given	the	special	privileges	that	it	has	previously	enjoyed	in	times	of	significant	change.	For
instance,	in	the	1990s,	the	impact	of	joining	the	Euro	on	London’s	financial	district	was	singled	out	as	a	key	criterion
used	in	government	decision	making,	reflecting	the	City’s	strategic	importance	in	the	UK	economy.	Compare	this	with
the	2017	New	Industrial	Strategy	that	makes	very	little	mention	of	the	financial	services	sector,	viewing	it	far	more	as
a	way	of	facilitating	growth	in	other	economic	sectors,	particularly	manufacturing.
The	second	uncertainty	in	understanding	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	UK’s	economy,	and	the	role	of	London	within
this,	lies	in	the	relationship	between	the	UK’s	financial	services	sector	and	the	international	financial	system.	We	now
understand	this	relationship	as	highly	complex	and	interwoven.	This	means	that	the	impact	of	any	Brexit	deal	on	one
particular	part	of	London’s	financial	services	ecosystem	could	have	profound,	but	unpredictable,	implications
elsewhere	in	the	system.	As	the	Chairman	of	HSBC	summarised	to	the	Treasury	Select	Committee	in	2017	“the
ecosystem	in	London	is	a	bit	like	a	Jenga	tower.	We	don’t	know	if	you	pull	one	small	piece	out,	whether	nothing
happens	of	indeed	if	there	is	a	more	dramatic	impact”.
These	uncertainties	have	not	been	resolved	in	the	keenly-awaited	publication	in	July	2018	of	the	UK	Government’s
White	Paper	on	‘The	Future	relationship	between	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	European	Union’.	On	the	critical	issue
of	financial	services,	the	White	Paper	recognises	the	interconnected	nature	of	financial	networks	between	the	UK
and	the	EU,	but	proposes	a	relatively	unspecified	“new	economic	and	regulatory	arrangement	with	the	EU	in	financial
services”	that	would	“maintain	the	economic	benefits	of	cross-border	provision	of	the	most	important	international
financial	services	traded	between	the	UK	and	the	EU”.
Crucially,	the	Paper	does	not	call	for	mutual	recognition	for	financial	services	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	Mutual
recognition	provides	greater	certainty	than	other	trade	options	for	the	relationship	of	financial	services	in	the	EU	and
UK	because	it	operates	on	the	basis	that	products	developed	in	one	country	can	be	sold	across	all	EU	member
states.	Reflecting	his	calls	for	a	softer	Brexit,	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	had	been	advocating	for	mutual
recognition	for	the	financial	services	sector	following	the	Brexit	vote,	most	recently	at	his	annual	Mansion	House
speech	in	June	2018.
In	contrast,	and	reflecting	the	fact	that	the	financial	services	sector	will	not	be	singled	out	for	special	treatment	within
the	Brexit	negotiations,	the	Paper	argues	for	a	broader	form	of	equivalence	between	financial	services	in	the	UK	and
EU.	Typically,	equivalence	creates	more	uncertainty	in	trade	relations	because	decisions	on	equivalence	are
unilateral.	In	this	scenario,	each	trading	partner	is	able	to	make	a	decision	(and	withdraw	this)	as	to	whether
regulations	in	the	trading	relationship	are	the	same,	thereby	allowing	goods	and	services	to	be	traded	between	the
two	parties.	In	order	to	address	this,	the	UK	Government	states	in	the	White	Paper	that	for	financial	services,	it	seeks
to	develop	a	“reciprocal	recognition	of	equivalence”	although	the	precise	mechanisms	through	which	this	would	be
developed	and	implemented	remain	far	less	certain.
It	is	this	ongoing	uncertainty	that	could	have	a	bigger	part	to	play	in	shaping	the	UK-EU	trade	relationship	in	financial
services	post	Brexit	than	policy	and	regulatory	pronouncements.	The	pace	of	London’s	financial	markets	move
markedly	faster	than	that	of	Brexit	negotiations	to	date.	The	uncertainty	surrounding	Britain’s	future	relations	with	the
EU	is	already	leading	to	a	growing	sense	amongst	financial	institutions	that	it	is	prudent	to	take	action	now	in
readiness	for	a	‘no	deal’	in	which	agreement	can’t	be	reached	by	the	March	2019	deadline.	For	example,	within
hours	of	the	White	Paper’s	publication,	the	Chief	Executive	of	Lloyd’s	of	London	argued	that	the	uncertainty	would
lead	to	the	firm	going	ahead	and	opening	a	planned	subsidiary	in	Brussels.	Part	of	this	relocation	activity	is	to	act	as
a	lobbying	force,	essentially	sounding	a	warning	shot	to	negotiators	that	if	the	financial	services	sector	in	London
does	not	get	the	type	of	Brexit	it	wants,	it	will	take	action	accordingly.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Brexit’s epicentre: London’s financial services sector and its place in the UK economy Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-07-30
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/07/30/brexits-epicentre-londons-financial-services-sector-and-its-place-in-the-uk-economy/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Whilst	the	precise	implications	of	such	actions	remain	unknown,	both	in	terms	of	any	deal	ultimately	struck	and	the
trajectory	of	London’s	international	financial	district,	it	makes	it	clear	that	understanding	what	is	happening	to	the	City
will	be	vital	in	understanding	the	precise	form	that	Brexit	takes.	Moreover,	the	uncertainty	of	the	negotiations	now
extends	beyond	the	nature	of	financial	services	relations	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	to	a	wider	questioning	of	the
position	of	London’s	financial	services	sector	economically	and	politically	within	UK	plc.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	draws	on	the	author’s	co-authored	work	(with	Professor	Dariusz	Wójcik)	published	in	Geoforum,
and	originally	appeared	at	our	sister	site,	British	Politics	and	Policy.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position
of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:
Pixabay/Public	Domain
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